The legal profession is not the most diverse of profession. For the longest time it was reserved for white cis men with enough financial mean to survive legal training. It has slowly opened its door to white cis women (although there are still issues, especially in the private sector). It is still very white and cis-hetero normative however. There are probably many causes for the homogeneity of the legal profession (financial barrier to access the profession, hiring biases in large firms, the image of the profession, etc). The Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) is at least currently considering ways to increase diversity in the profession. While the LSUC is far from having control over all the factors affecting diversity, it does have the power to accredit law schools, and law schools are often viewed as the true gatekeepers of the profession. This power is, however, rarely used as new law schools are a rare thing. Trinity Western University (TWU), a private university that caters to evangelical Christians, is the most recent university so seek accreditation. TWU has an infamous covenant that all students are required to sign. This covenant forbids sexual intimacy except between married heterosexual couples. This unsurprisingly shocked many people including benchers (the decision-makers of the LSUC). Accrediting TWU seemed, at the very least, to go against diversifying the legal profession. The LSUC ultimately rejected TWU accreditation because of its discriminatory covenant. A law suit ensued, pitting equality against freedom of religion. Days before Toronto Pride, the Ontario Court of Appeal (ONCA) upheld the decision of the LSUC. In this post, I shortly expose additional background on the case. I then explore the decision’s treatment of the LSUC’s decision making power. I finish by looking at the ONCA’s approach to the balancing of rights.
“[T]hroughout the world, species of animals, plants and other organisms are being lost forever at an alarming rate. The loss of these species is most often due to human activities, especially activities that damage the habitats of these species. Global action is required.”
These words are part of the preamble of Endangered Species Act, 2007 (ESA) of Ontario. The ESA was enacted to replace an older version of the legislation protecting endangered species, which provided insufficient protection. However, legislation does not necessarily result in actions. As noted by the Federal Court: “administrative laissez-faire contributes, along with uncontrolled—and irresponsible—human activity, to the destruction of natural habitats and the loss of wildlife species.” Sometimes administrative laissez-faire is not even the biggest problem; sometimes the government actively tries to undermine legislative protection. It is precisely what happened in Wildlands League v Lieutenant Governor in Council. In this case, the government of Ontario granted sweeping exemptions to entire industrial sectors through Ontario Regulation 176/13 (the Regulation), rendering the ESA protection meaningless for countless endangered species. The Regulation was challenged by the Wildlands League and the Federation of Ontario Naturalists. They sadly lost at the Ontario Divisional Court (the decision is being appealed). In this post I will analysed this surprising decision and its flaws. I will look specifically at the two main arguments for the invalidation of the Regulation: the pre-condition for the enactment of the Regulation, and its consistency with the ESA.
“I accept the undisputed evidence that there is some risk posed to Fraser River sockeye from diseases on salmon farms, but I cannot make a determination as to the precise level of risk. Therefore, precaution would suggest assuming that the risk is not insignificant.”
This quote could have been taken directly out of the recent Federal Court decision of Morton v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans) since the issues address by that case are closely related to the ones in front of the Cohen Commission of Inquiry (Cohen) 3 years before. In fact Justice Rinnie recognized this context. It seems, however, that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) did not head the wise words of Commissioner Cohen and continued to treat some serious salmon disease – specifically piscine reovirus (PRV) and heart and skeletal muscle inflammation (HSMI) disease – carelessly. But ignoring an issue does not make it go away. Thankfully for the vigilance of Ms. Morton, DFO will now have to rethink some of its approach to aquaculture. In Part 1 of this post, I explored the issues of the standard of review, the precautionary principle, and the reasonableness of the aquaculture fish transfer licence conditions. In this Part, I look at the issue of illegal sub-delegation of discretionary powers, especially in this case when discretion was delegated to the industry. I reproduced the background section of Part 1 below for ease of reference.
If you have ever spent any significant amount of time on the west coast, you know how important and contentious of an issue salmon fishery is. Salmon fishery is part of the culture of many First Nations and coastal communities. It is a considerable industry, both in terms of commercial fisheries and aquaculture. Its future is uncertain as stocks seem to fluctuate beyond the comprehension of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). There is no shortage of causes (diseases, pollution, poor management, climate change, etc), but as the Cohen Commission of Inquiry (Cohen) concluded, none is dominant. Among them is the risk caused by diseases brought in the salmons’ ecosystem through aquaculture. This particular risk is plague by a familiar environmental policy issue: scientific uncertainty. However, as Cohen found, this uncertainty does not in fact diminishes the risks. Last week, the Federal Court rendered a decision specifically on this issue in Morton v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), a decision that provide some much needed follow up on Cohen’s aquaculture conclusions. In part one of this two parts post I’ll look at the question of judicial review of a strongly circumscribed ministerial discretion, and the use of the precautionary principle in reasonableness review. In the second part I’ll look at the question of sub-delegation of regulatory requirements to industries.
Environmental litigation often brings in the popular imagination a battle between some big polluting corporations and marginalised people abandoned by the state (the movie Erin Brockovich comes to mind). Those cases do exist, but the majority of environmental law is operationalized by government agencies balancing competing interests, usually economic development with environmental protection. This often results in a compromise: allowing a polluting activity, but with some mitigation measure to limit the environmental effects. But what happens when the two competing interests in front of the executive are environmental protection? This is what the Environmental Review Tribunal of Ontario (ERT) had to deal with in the case Alliance to Protect Prince Edward County v Director, Ministry of the Environment, ultimately largely upheld by the Court of Appeal. This case presents the interesting issue of balancing the need for renewable energy and the impacts such a project can have on the environment, such as the endangered Blanding’s turtle.